We focus on 32 Croatian banks in the period [2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010] 
INTRODUCTION
During the financial crisis 2007/2008, many banks faced asset quality impairments, liquidity shortages and solvency problems, and consequently bankrupted (Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014) . After numerous bank failures and bailouts, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision developed the new regulatory framework which aims to improve the banking sector ability to absorb shocks arising from the financial and economic disturbances. However, when creating the new framework based on liquidity and additional capital requirements the Committee did not take into consideration that liquidity and solvency are two interrelated aspects of the business of banking. In this paper we summarize and extend the existing work on the liquidity and solvency concept and their nexus. The aim of this study is to identify the relationship between liquidity and solvency in the Croatian banking sector and to find out the impact of macroeconomic environment (proxy with GDP growth variable), bank asset quality (approximated with the non-performing loans indicator), profitability (measured with the return on assets) and size on bank liquidity and solvency levels in the period from [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . The most of data were collected and/or calculated from the publications available on the Croatian National Bank's (CNB) website, while some of them were supplemented with the data disclosed in annual reports of sample banks. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature regarding liquidity and solvency relationship with the Basel III framework in focus. Section 3 discloses empirical strategy and discusses research findings. In the last section conclusions are drawn.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical background explains liquidity creation as a consequence of certain level of bank capital throughout two opposing views about the relationship sign. Under the first stand, as discussed by e.g. Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) the higher capital facilitates bank liquidity creation throughout better risk absorption. The other view, as summed up by Berger and Bouwman (2009) , agrees that the higher bank capital has negative impact on bank liquidity creation due to: 1) the "financial fragility structure" effect -the higher capital means less monitoring and less attention paid to deponents which leads to less liquidity creation, and 2) the "crowding-out of deposits" effect as capital is less liquid than deposits and without deposits there is no credit supply and no opportunity to make a profit. In reality the bank liquidity and solvency nexus is much more complex than the above described cases from which it is transparent that the role of liquidity in shaping the bank capital is ignored (Distinguin et al., 2013) . Namely, empirical researches mainly employ a certain solvency indicator as a determinant of bank liquidity (e.g. Vodová, 2011; Munteanu, 2012) . Thus, empirical investigations which analyse the two-way relationship between bank liquidity and solvency are still novelty, although the new regulatory framework i.e. Basel III spurred vivid discussions about this nexus. The following observations additionally underline a relevance of this topic. Pierret (2015) did an empirical research on the sample composed of 49 publicly traded US banks over a 13-year period (2000-2013) and found that insolvency risk increases more during a crisis for banks which hold more short-term debt. Furthermore, the results indicate that a positive impact of bank profitability on its liquidity via short-term liabilities tends to disappear in crisis when bank is expected to suffer the capital financing shortage, so the aforementioned author highlights that well-capitalized banks reduce their individual and thus overall systemic risk. Similarly, Tarullo (2013) pointed out that additional capital requirements, above levels agreed within the Basel III framework, are necessary for banks which hold too much short-term debt. According to Diamond and Rajan (2000) bank runs together with the systemic risk play a major role in bank liquidity and solvency relationship. As a result of the fear of their spreading as well as the risk of repeating a financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed new reforms under the Basel III standard. Although higher capital ratios and new liquidity requirements are goaled to improve the banking sector stability, their high implementation costs might have a negative impact on banks' profitability. According to the summary of the Basel III monitoring report (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015), which was carried out in 224 banks, the full implementation of the new regulatory framework will strengthen bank capital and liquidity levels, but the only requirement which is almost completed in 2015 is that for Tier 1 capital. For instance, for the full implementation of other capital standards (Tier 2 capital and Leverage ratio) and liquidity standards (LCR-liquidity coverage ratio and NSFR-net stable funding ratio) there is still more than 950 billion EUR missing. With reference to that, Allen et al. (2012) emphasize the existence of trade-off between high costs of adjustments to the new reforms and financial stability. Also, they highlight the negative consequences of the new reform on bank liquidity management and the necessity of changing the regulatory definition of liquid assets. Authors conclude that the implementation of Basel III regulatory framework requires cooperation between macroprudential and monetary policy and bank supervisors. The role of the monetary policy was analysed by Merkl and Stolz (2009) . Their empirical research for the German banking sector for the period from 1999-2004 analysed the effects of banks regulatory capital on the transmission of monetary policy and revealed results that banks which are holding less capital and having less interbank liquidity react more restrictively to a monetary tightening than their average peer. Thus, Ercegovac and Kundid (2011) conclude that the new liquidity regulation and capital reform in the banking sector are not sufficient; changes in bank strategy, effectiveness of bank managers, market discipline and the redefinition of the lender of last resort role are necessary. Otherwise the Basel III regulatory framework will not be able to prevent future collapses of banking sectors. The work of several authors that additionally inspired this study hereafter follows.
For instance, Distinguin et al. (2013) studied the relationship between bank regulatory capital buffer and liquidity in the US and the European banking sector for the period from 2000-2006. The main result of this empirical testing conducted on the sample composed of 574 US banks and 207 European banks showed that banks decrease their regulatory capital when creating more liquidity. Also, the results showed that small-sized US banks actually strengthen their solvency when they meet higher liquidity needs. On the other hand, large banking institutions underestimate liquidity risk because of their too-big-to-fail position, but also due to managing their liquidity with off-balance sheet instruments. Somewhat earlier Berger and Bouwman (2009) obtained an empirical research also for the US banks for the period from 1993-2003 and found that even when they fulfill the minimum regulatory capital requirements, they strengthen their capital levels if facing higher liquidity creation demand, in order to ensure the higher risk protection. Moreover, predictions about the possible tradeoff existence between the benefits for the financial stability and the costs of lower liquidity creation induced by higher capital requirements are made (e.g. by Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Horváth et al., 2012) , so the new Basel standard might jeopardize liquidity creation, especially in the small-sized banks for which the negative impact of capital on liquidity creation was shown (e.g. in Berger and Bouwman, 2009 ). However, the risk of excessive liquidity creation for the banking stability should not be neglected as, for instance, Fungáčová et al. (2013) revealed results that the excessive liquidity creation increased the bank failure probability in the Russian banking sector over the period from 2000-2007. On the other hand, Batavia et al. (2013) presented results for the study covering liquidity creation within the global banking sector in the 1999-2008 period, and confirmed that banks which were solvent and profitable and had higher performing assets in the pre-bear phase were more able to ensure liquidity creation in the bear phase. A conclusion can be made on the desirability of having prudent liquidity creation i.e. the one which is smoothed during various phases of economic cycle, whereat bank solvency, profitability and asset quality could be considered as its main drivers. At last, Horváth et al. (2012) investigated the relation between bank capital and liquidity creation on the sample which encompassed 31 banks in the Czech Republic for the period from 2000-2010. Their research confirmed the financial fragility hypothesis and warned like Berger and Bouwman (2009) about the threat of contraction in liquidity creation in the financial sector caused by the new capital regulation. But besides that Horváth et al. (2012) also noticed an opposite relation -which means authors finding a negative, bi-causal relation between capital and liquidity creation, and concluded about the negative effects of excessive liquidity creation for the bank solvency as well.
To sum up, despite differences, the most of the presented findings justify necessity of implementing the minimum liquidity ratios as supplement to capital ratios, but without providing an answer regarding the optimal level i.e. the one which will ensure the banking sector stability, without causing sizeable loss in the economic output. Some studies highlight the relevance of bank size for the regulatory compliance, and stress out the challenge of imposing regulation on large banks, which often adopt regulatory rules in a different way than smaller ones and in contrast with regulator's intentions. Bank profitability and asset riskiness might also explain liquidity creation, as well as its economic surrounding i.e. the phase of economic cycle in the broadest sense. But regardless of those features, insolvent bank could hardly be liquid and thus the positive capital-liquidity relation is expected, while the impact of bank liquidity on its solvency is somewhat ambiguous. Altogether, a research hypothesis H1 is set up:
H1: Bank solvency and liquidity are mutually determined whereat the nature of the relationship depends on bank size.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The empirical research of bank solvency and liquidity interdependence is carried out on a data sample of 32 commercial banks in the Republic of Croatia in the period from [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . No later data have been taken into consideration due to crisis circumstances and regulatory measures adopted in order to prevent further disorder in the banking sector. Furthermore, only banks which had business and thus data continuity during the observed 9-year period were taken into consideration. Calculation of financial indicators is based on the publications available on the Croatian National Bank's (CNB) website as well as annual reports disclosed by sample banks. As the collected data have a spatial component (the data for 32 banks), as well as a time component (the data for the period of up to 9 years), the panel data analysis is considered as more suitable for the simultaneous analysis of both data characteristics, than the time series analysis or multiple regression method. To be more precise, data estimation is performed using the dynamic panel model which contains the lagged values of the dependent variable as due to a process of the first-order autoregression the usage of multiple regression is not recommendable. Namely, financial indicators in one period depend on the same financial indicators in the previous period. Generally, the dynamic relations could be expressed in the following manner:
(1) where i denotes an individual and t denotes time, μ is an intercept, γ is a parameter of the lagged dependent variable, β 1 , β 2 , ..., β K are the parameters of the exogenous variables, x it are independent variables, α i is an individual-specific effect and ε it the error term.
Moreover, for the empirical estimation, the GMM (generalized method of moments) Arellano-Bond two-step estimator is used, as the GMM system (Blundell-Bond estimator) is more appropriate in the case of larger number of groups and high value of autoregressive parameter.
Liquidity and solvency indicators are interchangeably employed both, as dependent and independent variables in developed models. Liquidity (LIQ) is measured with current liquidity ratio i.e. short-term assets over short-term liabilities, while solvency (CAP) is proxy with equity to assets ratio. Surely, those indicators are used as a second-best solution, due to lack of data for LCR (liquidity coverage ratio) and NSFR (net stable funding ratio), as well as capital adequacy ratio and other indicators related to regulatory capital. We consider the following variables as independent ones: non-performing loans over total loans (NPL) in order to control the credit risk/asset quality aspect and return on assets (ROA) as profitability indicator. In addition, GDP growth serves to depict macroeconomic surrounding, while interaction variables are used for identifying the bank size effect. Thus, SIZE_LIQ i.e. bank size dummy*LIQ serves to point out adjustment of bank, according to its size and liquidity level to solvency, which means that this variable is used only when CAP is dependent variable. On the other hand, SIZE_CAP or bank size dummy*CAP is used in order to find out the impact of bank size and solvency on liquidity level, and is employed only when LIQ is dependent variable. According to the CNB's criteria banks whose market share exceeds 5% are considered to be large banks, while those with market share in range from 1-5%, and below 1% are medium-sized and small banks, respectively. We use dummy variable 1 for large and medium-sized banks, and 0 for small banks. Correlation matrix confirms that the there exists no multicollinearity problem ( 
where i denotes an individual and t denotes time, μ is an intercept, γ is a parameter of the lagged dependent variable, β 1 , β 2 , …, β K are the parameters of the exogenous variables, α i is an individual-specific effect and ε i,t the error term. The mean value of equity to assets ratio is slightly lower than 15%, whilst current liquidity ratio has the mean value of about 94% (Table no. 2). However, Figure no. 1 shows that there is certain dynamics in those variables movements. Thus, the solvency indicator continuously falls down over the period 2002-2006 from the level of 16.5% to the level of about 14%. Since then it rose up to the level of almost 15%, after which is dropped to 13.5%. In the period from 2004-2010, starting with the mean value of 100%, the liquidity indicator was falling the most of time, ending the year 2010 with less than 92% of shortterm assets to short-term liabilities. Approximately, 6.8% of loans had reduced collectability (Table no. 2). Nevertheless, cyclicality of the NPL variable is transparent from the Figure no. 2 and its average movement is obviously U-shaped. The banking sector's ROA is almost 1% on average, and conclusion on its satisfying profitability can be made. However, attention should be paid to its continuous reduction since 2005. At last, NPLs and ROA are in line with macroeconomic surrounding (Figure no. 3) i.e. GDP growth and banking sector profitability are decreasing simultaneously with the greater credit risk. test) prove reliability and quality of all models as they exceed 0.10. The first-order autocorrelation (i.e. m 1 ) can be ignored as it is often being expected.
Both lagged dependent variables (LIQ i,t-1 and CAP i,t-1 ) have positive signs and are statistically significant. Thus, there is a certain persistency of these variables. However, estimated parameters are higher in case of CAP i,t-1 which means that solvency is more defined by the previous year than liquidity ratio. A conclusion can be made that the speed of adjustment of liquidity profile is higher than the speed of adjustment of solvency profile, a phenomenon that has a stronghold both in banking theory and practice. Namely, certain cyclicality in the bank capital accumulation and consumption is already confirmed for the South-Eastern European countries (Kundid Novokmet, 2015, p. 143) , what justifies prudential requirements regarding the counter-cyclical capital buffers as banks "are not always in a position to make ad hoc adjustments to the targeted capital levels". Results suggest that an increase in the equity to assets ratio in one period will add to solvency ratio in the following period. In our case, decrease of the CAP i,t-1 will cause a reduction in the CAP i,t (Figure no. 1) . Altogether, active liquidity management is more available to banks than the active capital management. Credit risk variable (NPL) negatively affects bank liquidity, but positively drives its solvency. This is expected as lower credit collectability means lower liquidity inflows and higher probability of liquidity crisis occurrence. Contrary, higher credit risk-taking should lead to a consequent capital build up by banks in order to be compliant with capital requirements. However difficult it might be to raise additional capital, adjustment costs of changing the bank risk profile are still more severe (Rime, 2001 ). On the other hand, more profitable business of banking (ROA) improves both liquidity and solvency. Namely, more profitable banks have easier i.e. more available and affordable access to short-term funding and obviously possess high quality i.e. performing assets. In addition, large banks are usually more profitable (e.g. Căpraru and Ihnatov, 2015) and do not have liquidityprofitability trade-off as they rather adopt borrowed liquidity strategy or balanced liquidity management strategy than the asset conversion strategy (Rose and Hudgins, 2013) , what is empirically confirmed for the Croatian banking sector in the pre-crisis period (Kundid Novokmet et al., 2016) . But besides availability of the interbank market funds, attention should be payed to affordability of the short-term liabilities as it is confirmed that over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] Croatian banks profitability was more determined with the interest costs on received loans than the interest costs on received deposits (Kundid, 2014) . Thus, sizeable increase of the interest costs on received loans, whether explicit ones what is the first sign of the financial turmoil, or implicit ones i.e. with associated regulatory costs, might justify maintaining higher asset liquidity even for the large banking institutions, which is usually happening simultaneously with the end of credit expansion, but still some presence of the profit persistency. With regards to profitability and solvency the obtained results are even more expected as bank profit is a part of its equity funds. Thus, bank capital can be increased internally, by earnings-retaining policy and vice versa, lower profitability might be a sign of market saturation and linked to equity to assets ratio meltdown due to excessive (risk-weighted) asset growth in the previous period. Figures no. 1 and no. 2 confirm that in Croatia slowdown in the banking sector profitability and equity capital spending happened simultaneously. Moreover, the negative impact of GDP growth on solvency confirms that there is certain cyclicality of CAP variable in case of these 32 banks, as higher the GDP growth, lower is the equity to assets ratio. Namely, after an initial capital build up phase which followed after the problems in many Croatian banks and rehabilitation process, credit growth and capital spending phase took place in a situation of favourable macroeconomic indicators i.e. until the year of 2007. The same conclusion would be valid for the LIQ models if GDP growth was statistically significant.
Finally, the interdependence between liquidity and solvency is confirmed. In model in which liquidity is set out as dependent variable it is found that more capitalized banks maintain higher liquidity. This confirms the view that by proving a certain credit capacity, higher capital enables bank to meet its liquidity needs. Similarly, for the Czech banking sector over the period 2001 , Vodová (2011 confirmed the assumption that sufficiently capitalized banks are expected to be liquid too. Further, Munteanu (2012) revealed the same positive effect of solvency (i.e. Tier 1 capital ratio) on bank liquidity (proxy with liquid assets over deposits and short-term funding) for the Romanian banking sector from [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Another explanation of our findings arises from the banking praxis in which smallsized banks are usually better capitalized ones (as they are not too-big-to-fail), and at the same time adopt asset conversion liquidity strategy due to unfavorable position on the interbank deposit and loan market. Namely, from the liquidity model with the interaction variable SIZE_CAP it can be concluded that larger banks with the higher capital base, will mostly tend to reduce their liquidity i.e. there is a trade-off between their solvency and liquidity as they want to use their capital for placements and not for liquidity storage. In addition, due to their credit capacity and too-big-to-fail status they can significantly increase short-term liabilities what reduces the value of selected liquidity indicator. On the other hand, if those banks have poor solvency, their growth limitations are reached as well as their going into debt, and thus they will maintain higher liquidity. In comparison to that, in the models in which solvency is set out as dependent variable mixed results occur, depending on the inclusion or exclusion of interaction variable. Thus, in case when SIZE_LIQ in included in model, LIQ has positive effect on solvency, and in the opposite case it has negative effect on solvency. We assume that the results are not consistent with the previous ones due to smaller number of observations in the first two models for the LIQ variable. However, explanation for the last case follows. Larger banks with higher liquidity ratio tend to decrease their solvency by increasing liabilities if the asset growth is planned or by liquid assets storage (in contraction times when profitability decreases) for which the regulatory capital is not required (or is just modestly required). Vice versa, larger banks with lower liquidity ratio will endeavor to increase their solvency as their short-term funding possibly reached the maximum and in order to avoid fire sales of assets.
At last, a conclusion can be made that in the most cases solvency is in complementary relationship with liquidity, except in the case of larger or too-big-to-fail banks where there is a certain trade-off. However, solvency problems cannot be solved with additional liquidity, while liquidity problems might be partly solved in case of solvent banks, as the lender of last resort should finance only illiquid, but solvent banks. Altogether, research findings demonstrate that separate regulation of liquidity and solvency is not desirable, while isolated management of solvency and liquidity is impossible as they are interrelated.
CONCLUSIONS
Recently, supranational prudential authorities prescribed additional capital and new liquidity requirements in order to outsource the lender of last resort function towards banks. However, in design of aforementioned requirements, policymakers neglected the linkage between solvency and liquidity as well as the relevance of bank size, what could be rather important factors for shape of regulatory compliance by banks, and consequently for achievement of regulators' intentions and targeted goals/results they had on mind when those regulatory instruments were enforced. We uphold the view that set up of linear regulatory instruments (i.e. the ones prescribed equally for all banks, regardless of their financial condition or size), rather than discretionary ones (i.e. those which would take into account bank specificities) makes one-size-fits-all problem still actual, and adds to permanent inefficiency of banking regulation. More precisely, with regards to the proposed measures, we assume that too much burden will be put on small banks, in comparison to larger banks, which are too-big-to-fail and thus, in a position to adapt to regulatory requirements in a more cost-efficient way.
Based on a 9-year data range for 32 Croatian banks we confirmed that liquidity and solvency regulation (and planning compliance with it) should be conducted simultaneously and special attention paid to too-big-to-fail banks as they tend to minimize regulatory costs with solvency-liquidity trade-off. Our results lead us towards a proposal of higher capital requirements for the larger and less liquid banks, similarly to policy recommendations disclosed by French et al. (2010) via Squam Lake Group report. In addition, disparities in solvency and liquidity ratio were found to be driven with asset quality, profitability and partly with an overall economic growth. At last, we recommend usage of Basel III liquidity and solvency indicators (e.g. LCR, NSFR, capital adequacy ratio) in future empirical work in order to obtain additional proof for our conclusions.
